Aims: In Norway, it is the responsibility of the country's 429 municipalities to provide long term care (LTC) services to their residents. Recent years have seen a sharp rise in the number of LTC users under the age of 65. This article aims to explore the effect of this rise on LTC expenditure. Methods: Panel data models are used on data from municipalities from 1986 to 2011. An instrumental variable approach is also utilized to account for possible endogeneity related to the number of young users. Results: The number of young users appears to have a strong effect on LTC expenditure. There is also evidence of municipalities exercising discretion in defining eligibility criteria for young users in order to limit expenditure.
Introduction
As in the other Scandinavian countries, provision of Long Term Care (LTC) in Norway is based on the principle of universal provision of welfare services [1] , and local governments play a key role in their provision. As in many countries, the forthcoming changes in the age composition of the population is described as the key challenge facing the financing of LTC, and the sustainability of the health care system in general. The nature of the relationship between ageing and healthcare expenditure is however not clear, and in the Norwegian case the number of users under the age of 65 has grown considerably [2] .
Several studies show that use of LTC services increases sharply with age, with people aged 80 and over being more than six times more likely to receive long-term care than people aged 65-79 in many countries [3] . Other papers cite proximity to death, rather than age, as being the most important predictor of health care costs [4] [5] [6] . Recent studies indicate that time-to-death is more important in explaining cost variations in specialist health care than in LTC, where age still is regarded as a main predictor [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
A substantial growth in the number of users under the age of 65 over the past decades calls for research into the role younger users have in determining expenditure on LTC. The number of people under the age of 65 who are using home-based LTC services in Norway increased by 178% between 1991 and 2010, with indications that these users receive more services than older users even after controlling for needs [13] . At the same time, other studies indicate that the majority of these users consume minimal resources, but that a small number are intensive users [14] . The effect of young users on overall spending is therefore unclear.
Aims
The main aim of this article is to estimate the effect of the rising number of young users on LTC expenditure.
An additional aim is to explore whether municipalities ration the level of service provided to young users.
Institutional setting
Norway is a unitary state with 19 counties and 429 municipalities as of 2012. Both the municipalities and the counties are lead by elected politicians. The municipalities vary greatly in size, ranging from the smallest with about 200 inhabitants to the largest (Oslo) with just under 600,000. The delivery of welfare services is to a large extent decentralized to these municipalities, but equality of quality and access between the municipalities is an important policy goal. As pointed out by [15] , the structure of local government financing in the Nordic countries represents an interesting puzzle. The rather extensive local decentralization is not matched by local autonomy, and municipalities are better described as agents for the central state rather than local clubs.
Taxation and block grants from the central state constitute the most important sources of revenue for the municipalities. Despite having some leeway within an interval defined by the central state, all Norwegian municipalities apply the maximum income tax rate. A fundamental goal underlying the financing system is that the municipalities are to be compensated in such a way that variation in the service profile is a result of municipal prioritization rather than unequal financial fundamentals [16] . Consequently, the grant system between the central state and the municipalities compensates municipalities with low tax revenues and high expected costs associated with delivering services.
Through the block grant system, municipalities with higher expected costs associated with delivering services are compensated. The grants received by each municipality are based on risk-adjusted capitation where the age composition and various sociodemographic variables are the main risk adjusters. In addition to these variables, there is special compensation for municipalities in rural areas.
Between 1986 and 2012, several national reforms were implemented in the health care system. Primary health care services were placed at the municipal level in 1984, and the responsibility for nursing homes was transferred from the counties to the municipalities in 1988. The HVPU (Helsevernet for psykisk utviklingshemmede) reform in 1992 transferred the responsibility for the mentally retarded to the municipalities from the counties. The HVPU reform may be the primary cause for the growth in users under the age of 65, however the growth in young users continued in the period after the HVPU reform [14] .
Materials and methods
LTC expenditure in the Norwegian municipalities is modelled over the period 1986-2011 within a standard expenditure demand framework adapted to analyse the public sector [17] [18] [19] . In the model of long term care we assume that local authorities make spending decisions based on the preferences of the voters. Demand equations derived from preferences and budget constraints typically have municipal incomes, grants and regulations, the age compositions of the population and structural features of the municipalities such as population density as explanatory variables [20, 21] . Many relevant factors remain fixed over time. The use of panel data allows us control for this heterogeneity, both observed and unobserved, and focus on the variable of interest.
Data and variables
The data cover Norwegian municipalities during the period 1986-2011. In 1986, there were 465 municipalities, compared to 430 in 2011. The dependent variable is the gross operating expenditure per capita on LTC by each of the municipalities. A number of independent variables are included. The first set of variables describes the share of the population in different age groups, namely the share under the age of 17, between 65 and 79, and over 80 years. Municipalities are responsible for the provision of nurseries and schools for inhabitants under the age of 17. Municipalities with a large share of inhabitants in this age group may have competition for funding, and thus lower expenditure on LTC. Municipalities with an older population are likely to have higher demand for, and expenditure on, LTC. The percentage of each municipality's population who die each year is also included, to control for the possibility that time-to-death may be important in explaining variation in LTC expenditure.
The focus of this paper is the role of young users. The share of the population who is under the age of 65 and receives home services is therefore included. This variable will give an indication of how much demand is generated by young users, and how resource-demanding these users are. The financial situation of the municipalities is controlled for by including the budget of the municipality, defined as the total gross operating expenditure per capita. The median income of each municipality's inhabitants is also included. The income of people in the municipality will affect municipalities' income from taxation, as well the ability to raise revenue through user charges.
Summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table I . These account for the panel structure of the data.
The data used are gathered from Statistics Norway and Norwegian Social Science Data Services.
Statistical models
Three types of panel data models are estimated. In these models, municipality and time-fixed effects are controlled for. The first model used is the standard fixed-effects model, with standard errors which are robust to clustering at the municipal level. All of the models considered are weighted by the average population over the period of analysis.
The second type of model used is an instrumental variable panel model. In this model, the share of the population who are young users is instrumented with the share of the population claiming a disability pension, and the unemployment rate. The reason for using this type of model is the possible endogeneity of the variable describing the share of young users. The municipality has some discretion in deciding who is eligible for LTC services, particular for this age group. On the other hand, eligibility for a disability pension is decided by the state, and not the municipality. People receiving this pension are assumed to be more likely to require LTC services.
The unemployment rate is also used, since it may either cause conditions requiring LTC or indicate their presence.
The third type of model used is a dynamic panel data model, which includes a lagged dependant variable. The models estimated use a two-step-system GMM approach. In these models, the share of the population receiving a disability pension and the unemployment rate are included as exogenous instruments. Lags are also included as instruments. Lags are limited to two periods to avoid the proliferation of instruments, given the length of the time span considered in the model.
Results

Descriptive statistics
In the sample of 409 municipalities which have existed for the duration of the study period, both the total budget and spending on LTC has risen. In 1986, spending on these services was 10,428 NOK per capita, rising to 16,671 NOK per capita in 2011. The proportion of the per capita-budget spent on LTC rose slightly from around 24% in 1986 to around 26% in 2011. Spending on LTC has therefore risen broadly in line with the overall budget.
With regard to the age structure of the population, the share in the youngest category (0-16 years) fell The age composition of people in LTC institutions has remained relatively stable from 1992 to 2011, the period for which data are available. The trends in the number of recipients of home care, shown in Figure 1 , are more dramatic. There appears to be a stable decline in the number of users aged between 67 and 79 years. The number of people aged 80 to 89 years has remained at around 60,000 over the whole period. The number aged 90 years and over has almost doubled over the period. The most striking feature is the substantial increase in the number of users under 67 years old. In 1992, the under-67 age group represented 17% of the total number of home users. By 2011, 39% of the recipients of home care were under the age of 67 years.
Regression analyses
The econometric models estimated are presented in Table II . Model M1 is the most parsimonious model, which accounts only for the age structure of the municipalities and the percentage of the population dying every year. These data are available from 1986 to 2011, whereas the other variables considered are available for only a subset of this period.
Model M1 confirms the expected results. Having a high share of people under the age of 17 years lowers expenditure on LTC. This supports a hypothesis that there is competition between generations for funding. As the share of the population over the age of 65 increases, expenditure on LTC rises. This effect is stronger for the share of the population aged 80 years and over. Controlling for the share of the population who die in a year has the expected sign, although is not significant. This is the case for all of the specifications considered. Time-to-death therefore does not appear to play an important role. This finding is inconsistent with previous results from the literature. Model M2 introduces the share of users of home services under the age of 65 years and the median income. This reduces the time span of the data. The effect of the number of young users is, as expected, positive and significant. Median income has a positive effect on LTC expenditure.
Model M3 should be interpreted differently from model M2, as it controls for differences in budgets. It therefore measures the uncompensated effect of the explanatory variables. The variables describing the age structure of the municipalities remain statistically significant, although are diminished in magnitude, suggesting that differences in age structure are only partially compensated for through grants from the central state. The share of young users is not significant at the 5%-level, suggesting that the expenses associated with these users are compensated for through the budget. Interestingly, in this model income has a negative effect on expenditure. In M2, the positive effect of income may be due to its positive effect on taxation revenue. When the budget is controlled for, the negative effect of income on expenditure may be due to a greater scope for user charges, income acting as a proxy for health status or indicating a greater use of private providers.
Models M4 and M5 are re-estimations of M2 and M3, which account for the possible endogeneity of the share of the young, home-service users. The share of the population who are unemployed and the share receiving a disability pension are used as instruments. The main effect is to greatly increase the magnitude of the coefficient attached to the share of young, home-service users. The magnitude of the coefficient is higher in M4 than M3, but the conclusion that expenditure related to young users is compensated for through the budget remains unaltered.
The changes in the instrumental variables models are in line with expectations. The hypothesis was that the endogeneity resulted from municipalities having at least some discretion in defining eligibility criteria for young LTC service users. The large change in the coefficients in models M4 and M5 suggest that municipalities have been using their discretion to limit the access of young users to services in order to control LTC expenditure.
Models M6 and M7 are re-estimations of M2 and M4 using a dynamic panel data model. These two models largely confirm the results from the static models. The share of young users continues to have a positive and statistically significant effect. In both models, the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant, suggesting that shocks to LTC expenditure persist over time.
Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to explore the role played by young users in determining the development of LTC costs over recent years. The descriptive statistics confirm that there has been a substantial rise in the number of LTC service users under the age of 65. The growth has primarily been in the number receiving services in their own home, rather than within institutions. Existing research suggests that many of these users may be low-intensity users, with a small percentage of very demanding users. It was therefore unclear how the rise in the number of users would translate into costs.
An additional complication was the potential endogeneity of the number of young users. It is conceivable that municipalities can exercise some discretion in defining who is eligible for LTC and on the level of service provided. This may also be particularly true for young users. In the paper, an instrumental variable approach was utilized to test for this. The results provided a strong indication of endogeneity, suggesting that municipalities do exercise discretion in deciding the coverage and level of service for young users. The effect of this discretion is to dampen the effect of the increase of young users. When instruments were used, the number of young users had a much stronger effect on the cost of LTC within a municipality.
A number of important policy issues are raised. Firstly, the rising number of young users has had an effect on the costs of providing LTC services. It is therefore important to understand the reasons for the rising numbers. Also of interest is whether rising costs associated with this users group has a detrimental impact on the service provision to older user groups, or indeed other services provided by the municipality. The level and quality of service provided to the young users themselves must also be considered. If municipalities are varying the level of service provision for these users, it is natural to ask whether this means that some users are being deprived of services which they require. The needs of these users and the types of services used by them must therefore be considered more carefully. Based on this, the budget allocation rules used by the central state may have to be reformulated.
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